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INTRODUCTION 
The original Sussex Manifesto (Singer et al 1970) emphasized the need for developing countries 
to build their own indigenous capabilities for science and technology, and to develop the 
planning tools required to ensure that these capabilities were employed in response to their own 
specific needs.  It also stressed that: 
 
The ‘need’ for science and technology may only be perceived if one takes a long-
term, perspective view of development because many R&D projects take a long 
time to give results (Singer et al 1970: paragraph 117). 
 
Since then, the role of ‘perspective planning methods’ to identify needs, which the manifesto 
argued must be ‘used in much greater detail than is normally done’, has become mainstream in 
many parts of the world, whilst remaining underutilised in others.  In the intervening years as the 
world has become more interconnected, there have been increasing examples of international 
initiatives to apply science, technology and innovation to development objectives, and the 
potential impacts of increasingly pervasive emerging technologies have led to a need to re-think 
some of these questions. 
 
This background paper focuses on the potential role that international science and technology 
‘foresight type’ activities might play in informing decision-making processes about innovation, 
development and emerging technologies. The discussion covers two ‘foresight type’ activities, 
both of which are formal processes for informing the governance of research and innovation. 
These are: 
 
 technology foresight, typically defined as ‘systematic and explicit attempts to identify 
areas of strategic research and emerging generic technologies likely to yield the 
greatest economic and social benefits’ 
 technology assessment, typically defined as: ‘anticipation of impacts and feedbacks in 
order to reduce the human and social costs of learning how to handle technology in 
society by trial and error.’ 
 
Essentially, technology foresight (TF) aims to open up space for thinking about new possibilities. 
The idea is to inform priority setting and investment in research and technology development, in 
both the public and private sectors, and more generally to contribute to shaping agendas, 
debates and decision-making about science and technology. Technology assessment (TA), on 
the other hand, is concerned with selecting, or modifying developments. The idea is to 
anticipate and evaluate technological impacts, so as to inform decision-making processes about 
projects or programmes with a strong technological component, and sometimes to contribute 
to broader agenda building. Kuhlmann et al (1999) have argued that the combination of 
traditions from TF and TA (they also include R&D evaluation) can lead to higher synergies in what 
they term ‘strategic intelligence’, and this is also the stance taken in this paper.  
 
National experiences with TF and TA approaches are quite diverse but over time both 
approaches, TA in particular, have evolved in many national settings; in general shifting 
somewhat from expert-led, reductive processes with associated scientistic notions of ‘objective 
neutrality’ to somewhat more plural processes in which a broader array of participants are 
5 
 
involved, and wider sets of assumptions about, for example, what the problems are, or what 
desired futures might be, are brought into appraisal. This paper briefly reviews those 
developments and considers what scope there might be to conduct elements of these within 
international institutions, with an explicit focus on development.  
 
Currently, TF and TA activities are largely undertaken at national levels, predominantly in the 
industrialised countries. The reason for this is straightforward enough: decisions about priority 
setting and the allocation of R&D, at least in the public sphere, are largely a national-level activity. 
There are, however, various international institutions that have a development agenda, and that 
undertake general assessments of say agriculture, or climate change, and these often include 
some kind of technology assessment/foresight-type activity, though perhaps not always 
explicitly labelled as such. The outputs of such international institutions, though rarely linked 
directly to R&D funding decisions, may nevertheless have long-run indirect effects on the 
priority setting and resource allocation decisions undertaken by a range of public and private 
actors. The argument outlined here is that there may be scope for conceiving of international 
foresight activities as a mechanism for constructing, framing and articulating development 
‘needs’, and for bringing these to bear on innovation actors. This would, however require 
considerable attention to how foresight activities are designed and conducted, and the 
difficulties of dealing with a very large array of global actors and perspectives. 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
Technology Assessment (TA), emerged initially in the USA during the 1960s, and was 
institutionalized in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972, and subsequently in 
several other OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s, though with comparatively less generous 
funding. TA institutions outside of the USA were often modeled on the OTA and for example 
often served the legislature. TA emerged partly as a consequence of the political fallout from the 
environmental and anti-nuclear movements, and what Wynne (1975) described as the anxious 
desire within US intellectual and policy circles for political consensus. Amidst sharply conflicting 
arguments about the effects of certain technologies, the institutionalization of TA activities was 
seen by its proponents as providing an objective, indeed a scientific, analysis of the impacts of a 
technology in order to assist subsequent political decision-making about which technologies 
should be funded for development. Thus in 1976 Brooks noted that: ‘Ideally the concept of TA is 
that it should forecast, at least on a probabilistic basis, the full spectrum of possible 
consequences of technological advance, leaving to the political process the actual choice 
among the alternative policies in the light of the best available knowledge of their likely 
consequences’ (Brooks 1976: 20). 
 
TA has been used with a focus on either a specific technology or group of technologies, or on 
technology related problems and has covered a wide range of social, economic, legal, political, 
cultural and ecological effects. No standard methods were used. Early efforts, reflecting the 
technocratic ideology of TA’s champions, focused on statistical and mathematical models, but a 
variety of quantitative and qualitative methods have been used. These range from 
brainstorming, literature research, document analysis, expert consultation, case studies, cross-
impact analysis, cost/benefit analysis, trend extrapolation, decision trees, Delphi methods, 
computer simulations, and scenario development. The most common data sources were 
surveys of existing literature supplemented by ‘opinions of experts’ based on discussions, simple 
questionnaires or Delphi techniques (Dylander 1980). 
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Following the institutionalization of TA in the OTA, it rapidly became clear, in practice as well as in 
principle, that it was not possible to fully anticipate impacts, in part because, as Guston and 
Sarewitz note, ‘…consequences emerge not from the static attributes of a fully formed 
technology, but from the complex co-production that simultaneously and continually molds 
both technology and social context’ (2002: 8).  Furthermore, assessment was anything but 
neutral and objective. Critics note how technology assessments were crucially dependent on 
non-technical and often implicit framing commitments, for example, about the nature of the 
problems requiring assessment, the scope of appraisal, the types of effects to assess, the 
appropriate methods to employ, and so on (Wynne 1975). In the US, stakeholder involvement 
and other forms of participation were methods OTA developed to counter accusations of lack of 
social neutrality, especially in definitional decisions such as over what technologies to assess, 
and the kinds of issues to include and exclude from assessment.  
 
The early technocratic vision of TA is nevertheless alive and well, especially in its more narrow 
incarnations as risk analysis or environmental impact assessment. These often share the over-
optimism that all important impacts can and will be anticipated, and are organised around the 
same decisionist model of TA in which ‘objective’ science precedes subsequent political 
processes (cf. the distinction between risk assessment and risk management). Risk analysis is 
however often far more narrowly conceived than early TA. It tends to focus on one particular 
implementation of a technology, such as a specific plant or specific product, rather than a 
technology as a whole, let alone technological options, and is usually confined to direct physical 
effects of the investigated technological product or process, rather than broader social impacts 
or more indirect impacts. Such highly reductionist approaches to assessment of ‘risk’ are 
increasingly practiced in international institutions whose global remit inevitably involves 
development concerns, for example in the food standard setting process of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commssion. 
 
TA as a more general policy tool declined in the USA after the OTA was ‘defunded’ by a 
Republican Congress under the first Clinton administration in 1995 (Houghton 1995). But TA 
continues to be practiced elsewhere, especially in Europe. Since the 1980s, European traditions 
of TA have evolved to include more broad-based, inclusive forms of appraisal that are often far 
more sensitive than their more expert-analytical predecessors to the negotiation and 
justification of prior framing commitments. For example, Participatory Technology Assessment, 
developed largely in Denmark – like the broadly similar ‘interactive technology assessment’ 
developed in the Netherlands in the 1980s –was a reaction to a demand for a more socially 
oriented approach to technology and for a greater scope for public influence and participation in 
decision-making. Participatory Technology Assessment involved politicians, NGOs, trade unions, 
journalists, scientists, technology developers, and lay people; it experimented with different 
methods to represent that variety of actor (e.g. dialogue fora, focus groups, and consensus 
conferences), and was concerned to make interests and values explicit. Often, the analytic 
product became of relatively minor importance compared to the interactive process, and the 
aim of agenda building, articulating views about new technology and fostering public debates on 
technology. Participatory forms of TA have become widespread in many industrialised countries, 
although not necessarily linked to subsequent decision-making about the allocation of 
resources.  
 
Other branches of TA have emerged. In the Netherlands, ‘constructive’ TA sought to introduce 
not just a broader scope of issues into assessment activities and a more extensive array of 
participants, but crucially aimed at influencing both parliamentary decisions as well as on-going 
technological design decisions (Rip et al 1995). ‘Interactive’ TA has stressed the importance of 
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involving all relevant stakeholders in analysis so as to offer insights into the extent to which 
possible development paths are considered meaningful to those actors and to offset the 
normative biases inherent in less plural processes. It explicitly aims to open up not only a wide 
array of possible solution strategies but also the definitions of the problem at issue. Loeber 
describes how one Dutch interactive TA on crop protection issues went beyond the ideal of 
doing justice to the plurality of perspectives that defined the crop protection problem, but also 
intended that the project should result in a fundamental policy reframing of that problem 
(Loeber 2004). 
 
In summary, TA, at least in some jurisdictions and under some guises, has expanded noticeably 
from a technocratic, expert-led analytical exercise to encompass more pluralistic and reflexive 
approaches that allow greater attention to the framing of agendas, problem definitions, and the 
breadth of inputs. Performed sensitively, TA can open up and illuminate options and 
opportunities in the technical or social sense in ways that are sensitive to the (albeit indirectly 
constructed) values and aspirations of otherwise marginalised actors. Yet as Van Eijndhoven 
(1997) usefully reminds us, TA is largely a Parliamentary advisory activity and does not directly 
influence the power base behind technological choices. Actors may therefore always conclude 
that they are not helped (or not helped effectively enough) by such additional information. 
TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT 
Unlike TA, Technology Foresight (TF) has from the outset been far more closely integrated with 
innovation actors, although it remains a narrower, expert-led activity by comparison with the 
more recent TA initiatives. Large firms have engaged in TF activities as part of their strategic 
management process for decades but it has only been since the 1980s and 1990s that it 
became an organised part of national governments’ science and technology policies. TF 
emerged out of ‘technological forecasting’ activities in the 1960s and 1970s which were 
extrapolative and predictive; they assumed a single discrete and determinate future. TF, 
however, is a less deterministic endeavour. As described by Grupp and Linstone, ‘Foresight takes 
into account that there is not a single future. Depending on action or non-action at present, 
many futures are possible, but only one of them will happen. To select a desirable future and to 
facilitate its realization is one of the aims of technology policy.’ (Grupp and Linstone 1999) 
 
TF involves a combination of analysis and communication processes in which stakeholders 
participate in a forward-looking exercise. Typically, in some of the early foresight initiatives, such 
as the first UK foresight initiative conducted in the mid 1990s, panels of industry stakeholders 
together with government and academic members would identify key trends and issues within 
an economic sector, develop scenarios, and consult using workshops and Delphi techniques. 
The aim was to identify the likely social, economic and market trends in a sector over a period of 
say 10-20 years and the developments in science, engineering, technology and infrastructure 
required to best address identified ‘needs’. Delphi techniques involve successive iterations of a 
given questionnaire, to show convergence of opinions and to identify dissent or non-
convergence. Experts are encouraged to revise their earlier answers in light of the replies of 
other members of their panel. Thus the methods aim to bring about consensus and 
convergence. Recommendations seek, typically, to identify possibilities where there is a 
convergence of scientific and technical feasibility and potential social and economic benefits. 
Thus, TF, at least in its early incarnations was concerned to anticipate ‘optimal’ technological 
pathways that met expert-defined economic and social ‘needs’ of a national economy. Such 
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approaches often obscured key framing choices about contending technological pathways and 
futures, and the social purposes, needs, benefits, risks and priorities for technology. 
 
Early foresight often focused on so-called critical technologies that were regarded as key to 
future competitive economic development. The rationale was one of market failure - of firms 
having excessively short horizons such that intervention is necessary to stimulate them to take a 
longer view and consequently to afford a higher priority to research (Georghiou 2001). The key 
actors involved were from academia and industry, particularly those able to span the gap 
between the two institutions. A key driver of TF was increasingly competitive markets and the 
need to set priorities for funding science and technology in the face of restricted budgets and 
increasing competition, but there has not always been a direct link established with funding 
mechanisms.  
 
Many commentators have argued that it is not just the product, i.e. the identification of 
‘promising’ technologies that is important in TF but rather that the process of facilitating 
networking and information flows among actors is just as, or even more, important a goal. For 
example, Martin and Johnston (1999) point to a variety of process benefits: greater 
concentration on the longer-term future, a degree of consensus on desirable futures, 
commitment to turning ideas into action, and enhanced communication and co-ordination 
among companies, among researchers and between researchers, users, and funders. Martin and 
Johnston argue that TF offers a means of ‘wiring up’ and strengthening the connections within 
the national innovation system so that knowledge can flow more freely among the constituent 
actors, and the system as a whole.  
 
More recent foresight exercises have been somewhat broader in scope and process than the 
first initiatives. There has been a shift away from the use of the Delphi technique towards panel 
or scenario-based approaches, for example, and a broader range of stakeholders beyond 
industry and the research community, has been involved. TF has covered not just ‘critical’ 
technologies, but also technological activities (e.g. food, health) and increasingly the societal 
context of technology applications (e.g. aging populations). This shift is represented by 
Georghiou (2001) as a ‘third generation’ of foresight in which the focus on market failure is 
replaced by one of system failure or socio-economic problem solving. This has involved greater 
input from a wider variety of social actors such as NGOs and parts of government beyond those 
directly responsible for science and technology. As van Langenhove puts it, contemporary TF 
now ‘can be made by a broad set of methods, ranging from desktop research, interactive 
brainstorm processes, to broad participatory arrangements. The scope for foresights can be any 
issue of societal relevance, in which knowledge, science and/or technology plays a considerable 
role.’ (2002:45) Experiments with ‘social technology foresight’ have aimed to bring a wider range 
of social values and objectives to bear on the definition of the objectives of technology policy, 
and on the mapping of alternative possible paths of technology development and their 
implications (See Todt and Lojan 1998). Thus, as with TA there has been an evident broadening 
of TF with some movement towards the development of broader, more pluralistic approaches to 
appraisal, and the aim of contributing to a more normative debate about technological futures. 
Certainly calls for such movement exist. Renn, for example, stresses that in addition to expert-
based elements of foresight, designed to open up space for examining technological 
opportunities, the inclusion of wider groups of stakeholders to address uncertainty and 
ambiguity (i.e. conflicting values) over possible futures should be a key part of foresight (Renn 
2002). There are clear tensions however between the often explicit goal in TF of building 
consensus and the equally understandable goal of articulating a wide variety of visions of the 
future.   
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INTERNATIONAL FORESIGHT AND ASSESSMENT 
Technology Foresight remains largely a national endeavour. There are a few institutions 
conducting regional or multi-economy foresight exercises such as the European Commission’s 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, UNIDO’s foresight programme focused on Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and a Center for Technology foresight under the umbrella of Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Commentators readily acknowledge the difficulties 
involved in conducting foresight at a multi-economy scale. These include those of adjusting to 
the increasing actor, stakeholder, and context complexity and to the different sets of worldviews 
and value sets represented; the difficulty of developing meaningful strategy-relevant 
discussions, as the number and diversity of interests represented increases; and the 
underdevelopment of formal institutions which are empowered and endowed with resources to 
respond to the types of outputs that typically emerge from foresight exercises (IPTS-JRC 2002). 
 
Technology Assessment also remains a largely national endeavor.  This is partly due to the fact 
that the established institutional niche (as already noted) is predominantly in association with 
national level parliaments – and that such legislative functions do not occur at other governance 
levels. Where they do (as in the European Parliament), there have emerged incipient technology 
assessment bodies like the European Science and Technology Options Assessment office 
(STOA).
1
 Other intergovernmental bodies with remits addressing the informing of technology 
choice do from time to time conduct exercises with many characteristics of more traditional 
technical and expert-based technology assessment. An example would be the periodic reviews 
of technological mitigation and adaptation options undertaken by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). However, these kinds of initiative tend to fall far short of the 
breadth and depth of functions and issues addressed by bodies such as the US OTA (in its day) or 
its European offshoots, Teknologiradet in Denmark
2
 and Rathenau Instituut
3
 in the Netherlands. 
 
As noted earlier, some other international institutions, such as Codex, also conduct aspects of 
TA, in this case risk analysis of food and agricultural technologies. The UN Commission on 
Science and Technology for Development, established in 1992, is responsible, amongst other 
things, for ‘initiating arrangements for the early identification and assessment of new scientific 
and technological developments which may adversely affect the development process as well as 
those which may have specific and potential importance for that process …’ (UN Resolution 
34/218, 1979) As such, it appears to come closest to an international institution concerned with 
development with an explicit responsibility for technology assessment at international level. 
Thus far, however, only very limited TA-like activities appear to have been conducted, covering 
biotechnology and ICT, and these have been fairly traditional exercises based on high level 
meetings and expert-based reviews (See for example UNCTAD 2004; Commission on Science 
and Technology for Development 2005). 
 
When considering the globalised nature of innovation systems, this general lack of international 
institutional capacity for broad-based technology assessment is quite striking. It is particularly 
stark because many of the most important tensions around the unintended or unforeseen 
consequences of technological change actually arise at an international level, where options 
                                                 
1
 See STOA website at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/about/default_en.htm (9 September 2009) 
2
 See Teknologiradet website at http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?page=forside.php3&language=uk (9 
September 2009) 
3
 See Rathenau Instituut website at http://www.rathenauinstituut.com/default.asp?steID=2 (9 September 
2009) 
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developed in certain specific contexts are extended to other quite radically different contexts. 
This frequently acknowledged dilemma in which emerging technologies from ‘advanced 
countries’ are noted to have negative impacts on the ‘developing countries’, was also discussed 
in the original Sussex Manifesto (which termed these ‘backwash effects’ – see paragraphs 2, 44 
and 92). In the early 1980s, Oldham and Kaplinsky discussed the idea of an ‘early warning 
system’ to investigate emerging technologies, their potential benefits and future negative 
impacts.  More recently, advocacy groups such as ETC Group have argued for an International 
Convention on the Evaluation of New Technologies (ICENT) (ETC 2005). 
 
In general, it appears that international institutions that already conduct some form of 
technology foresight/assessment, in particular those within the UN ambit, have often been 
slower to respond to the kinds of critiques leveled at TA and TF at a national level. There is, for 
example, little discernible retreat from highly scientistic practices of risk analysis at the Codex in 
the way that is beginning to occur in many national jurisdictions. As mentioned, the IPCC also 
remains primarily a highly technical body. This is perhaps a result of greater insulation from 
mechanisms of accountability and civic engagement.  
 
More interesting, perhaps, are a few international institutions that have undertaken general 
assessments involving some kind of extended or interactive technology assessment/foresight-
type activity. Even though not always explicitly labelled as such, these present useful models on 
which further experiment might be based. Arguably foremost amongst these are the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment and the International Assessment for Agricultural Science and 
Technology for Development (IAASTD). The latter is interesting in that it was an assessment of 
the future of agricultural science and technology in relation to development, that explicitly 
aimed to avoid the top-down, Northern-dominated expert assessments of the past, and instead 
aimed to be more inclusive and participatory in both its design and process. Some 900 people 
across 110 countries were involved in a multi-stakeholder process involving business, civil 
society and policy-makers. Scoones (2008) describes how the IAASTD process struggled to 
maintain a plural inclusive process that genuinely tackled normative and political issues, and that 
opened up debates and options on agricultural science and technology issues. The tensions 
proved to be extremely difficult to resolve.  For example, between the reflexive ideal of allowing 
contrasting framings to be debated and different political and value positions to be 
acknowledged on the one hand, and on the other, that of reaching common understandings and 
visions for the future, based on the ideal of consensus and an appeal to the objectivity of science 
and expertise.  
AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESIGHT AND ASSESSMENT? 
Technology Foresight has an overtly future-oriented focus, but without a great deal of explicit 
attention to the relative pros and cons of alternative socio-technical options. Technology 
Assessment, in examining the potential impacts of proposed technology commitments 
sometimes looks at strategic options, but it does this without much extension into the future. 
Combining the merits of both approaches could help to make more explicit the particular 
contingencies, contexts, conditions or perspectives under which different possible technologies 
might alternatively be favoured, and the possible implications of those options, in terms of both 
the nature and distribution of impacts. A number of authors have also argued that 
foresight/assessment activities can contribute explicitly to the development of adaptive policy 
strategies that intentionally foster diversity in policy and technological options (Weber 2002). As 
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such, foresight/assessment activities might serve as an appraisal tool that directly addresses the 
Manifesto’s 3Ds of direction, distribution, and diversity. (See Stirling 2009) 
 
Unless they are formally linked to the existing institutional framework for world trade regulation, 
international foresight/assessment exercises may be unlikely to involve direct links with 
resource allocation decisions. However, as Kuhlmann et al (1999) note, foresight-like activities 
are a way of obtaining opinions, conflicting or otherwise, about future developments and these 
are capable of creating synthesis, they are disruptive and interfere with current modes of 
thought, thus forming and shifting values. Such efforts at appraisal can have long-run indirect 
effects on the priority setting and resource allocation decisions undertaken by a range of public 
and private actors. Martin and Johnston’s analogy of foresight’s role in ‘wiring up’ the innovation 
system is pertinent here. If foresight/assessment exercises manage to broaden the process and 
actors involved in such exercises so as to include stakeholders and perspectives that are 
relatively marginalized in global and national innovation systems, then foresight/assessment 
might be a mechanism for constructing, framing and articulating development ‘needs’, and for 
bringing these to bear on innovation actors. 
 
Yet, as many commentators have argued, foresight/assessment activities are well able to 
obscure the diversity of perspectives and values extant in society that bear on possible and 
desirable technological futures. Interestingly, technological controversies - that play out beyond 
the institutional confines of foresight/assessment exercises - have often been recognized as 
informal processes of technology assessment (Cambrioso and Limoges 1991). The absence of 
institutional control has often meant greater scope for articulating alternative framings of what 
is at stake in technological issues, and often more vigorous and wide-ranging analyses. The 
challenge is to capture the plurality of perspectives and the energy that often arises in these 
more informal processes, and to build on the more innovative formal developments at national 
level that recognize the open-endedness, contingency and capacities for social agency in 
technology choice. These have attempted to open up appraisal to a broader range of salient 
bodies of knowledge and disciplines, address uncertainty explicitly and better reflect and bring 
into appraisal the perspectives and values of a wider range of actors, especially those that are 
marginalized in existing innovation processes.   
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